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STEVENS v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION-WHEN DOES 
A TOTAL DISABILITY BECOME PARTIAL? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs,l the Ninth Circuit held that an employee's disability 
that was total does not become partial for purposes of compen-
sation until suitable alternative employment is available to the 
employee.2 Interpreting the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act (LHWCA),3 the court answered an issue not 
previously decided: when does a total disability become partial?" 
1. Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 909 F.2d 1256 
(9th Cir. 1990) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Ferguson, J., and Preger-
son, J. concurring), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3502 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1991) (No. 90-515). 
2. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1257 (reversing and remanding a decision of the Benefits 
Review Board). 
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1990). 
4. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259. The court's interpretation of the Act rejected the Ben-
efit Review Board's retroactive application of an employee's change of disability status 
(total to partial) to the date of maximum medical improvement. Id. at 1257. Maximum 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS 
In May of 1981, petitioner Wilborn Stevens, a Lockheed 
employee, injured his right arm in a work related accident:! He 
received medical treatment, including two surgeries, and at-
tained maximum medical improvement on November 29, 1982.6 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that Stevens had lost 
20 percent of the use in his right arm.7 Lockheed paid Stevens 
temporary total disability from the date of injury until February 
6, 1983.8 After this date, Lockheed began to pay permanent par-
tial disability compensation for a 20 percent loss of use of a 
right arm.9 
At a December 1985 hearing on Stevens' claim for compen-
sation before the ALJ, it was concluded that Stevens had a 
residual earning capacity.lO A vocational specialist established 
that Stevens could perform a job in a convenience food store or 
a self-service gas station as of September 30, 1985.11 Lockheed 
did not contend that it had proven these jobs were available to 
Stevens at any earlier date. 12 
The ALJ awarded Stevens the following compensation: a) 
temporary total disability, from May 1981 to November 29, 
1982; b) permanent total disability, from November 30, 1982 to 
September 29, 1985 (after which date jobs were found to be 
available); and c) permanent partial disability, from September 
30, 1985 until benefits ended by schedule. IS Lockheed appealed 
to the Benefits Review Board the ALJ's award of permanent to-
5. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1257. 
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 1257-58. 
8. [d. at 1258. 




13. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1258. Permanent total disability pays 66 % % of the 
worker's average weekly wage for the duration of the disability. 33 U.S.C. § 908(a) 
(1990). Temporary total disability pays 66 2/3 % of the average weekly wages during the 
duration of the disability. 33 U.S.C. § 908(b). Permanent partial disability pays 66 % % 
of the average weekly wage for a length of time determined by schedule. 33 U.S.C. § 
908(c) (emphasis added). 
2
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tal disability from November 30, 1982 to September 29, 1985.H 
On appeal, the Benefits Review Board vacated and reversed 
the ALJ's award of permanent total disability between Novem-
ber 1982 and September 1985. Iii The Board found Stevens was 
only entitled to permanent partial disability benefits for that 
period.I8 In so doing, the Board retroactively applied the show-
ing of alternative available jobs to the date of maximum medical 
improvement. 17 
B. THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT 
The LHWCA establishes disability coverage for four differ-
ent categories: permanent total, temporary total, permanent par-
tial and temporary partial disability.I8 The Act defines "disabil-
ity" as incapacity due to injury to earn the wages which the 
employee was earning at the time of injury in the same or any 
other job. I9 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit noted that an injured worker has the 
burden of showing the injury was work related and that it pre-
vents performance of his prior job.20 Upon such a showing, the 
employer has the burden of proving that suitable alternative 
work is available in. the community.21 If the employer fails to 
meet this burden, the ALJ will hold that the disability is total 
and, probably, permanent.22 The employer must identify specific 
14. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. (emphasis in original). 
17. Id. 
18. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259. See 33 U.S.C. § 908 (a)-(c), (e) (1990) and supra note 
13. 
19. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(10) (1990) which provides: .. 'Disability' means incapacity 
because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of 
injury in the same or any other employment .... " 
20. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258. See Hairston v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 849 F.2d 1194 
(9th Cir. 1988) (upheld ALJ's finding that employer failed to meet its burden of demon-
strating alternative work was available to claimant, who was employed as a rigger before 
injury). 
21. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258. See Hairston, 849 F.2d at 1196. 
22. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1258. 
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jobs that the claimant is capable of performing.23 
In determining when a total disability becomes partial, the 
Ninth Circuit looked to the statutory language and policy con-
cerns encompassed by the LHWCA.24 The court observed that 
the statute indicates two independent variables of disability: na-
ture (or duration) of disability and degree of disability.211 The 
statute's four disability categories use the words "temporary" 
and "permanent" to denote the duration (nature) of the disabil-
ity; "total" and "partial" go to the severity (degree) of disabil-
ity.26 The court concluded that maximum medical improvement 
is indicative of permanent/temporary disability and availability 
of alternative work is indicative of partial/total disability.27 As a 
result, the court reasoned that the statute's structuring of the 
term "disability" supports a change from total disability status 
to partial disability at the date of available suitable alternative 
employment.28 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the statutory definition of 
"disability" contains a wage-earning component.29 The degree of 
physical disability is measured by its impact on the employee's 
earning capacity.30 The court thus reasoned that a claimant is 
only able to work when there is a suitable job available that he is 
capable of performing.31 In assessing an employee's capability to 
perform possible work, the Benefits Review Board must consider 
the claimant's skills along with the likelihood given the claim-
ant's education, age and background, that he would be hired if 
he diligently pursued the potential job.32 
23. [d. See Bumble Bee Seafoods v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, 629 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirmed Benefit Review Board's granting of 
benefits for total disability to claimant where employer did not show specific jobs availa-
ble that injured claimant could perform). 
24. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
27. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 1259. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(10) (1990) and supra note 19 for statutory 
language. 
30. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259. See Bumble Bee, 629 F.2d at 1328. 
31. Steuens, 909 F.2d at 1259. 
32. [d. at 1258. See Hairston v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 849 F.2d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
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The Benefits Review Board maintained that an employee's 
capability to perform a given task neither increases nor de-
creases between the time he reached maximum medical im-
provement and a later showing of an available job.33 The Ninth 
Circuit observed, however, that in holding that a disability 
changes from total to partial at the same time it changes from 
temporary to permanent, the Board ignored the economic aspect 
- the degree of disability.34 The court also noted that the Board 
assumed that the job market at .the time of maximum medical 
improvement was the same as when the job showing was made.311 
Since this point was not proven, the court reasoned that an al-
ternative job within the claimant's abilities may not have ap-
peared until sometime after maximum medical improvement 
was attained, or the claimant may have required training and 
education after maximum medical improvement to obtain a suit-
able job.36 Since courts have no way of knowing the actual cir-
cumstances, the fact on which a change in disability status will 
turn must be proof of an actual job which the claimant is able to 
perform and can realistically obtain if diligently sought.37 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit noted that its interpretation of the 
LHWCA best serves the statute's policy interest in encouraging 
injured workers back into the work force by providing employers 
with an incentive to inform workers promptly of available jobs.36 
Creating that incentive enables claimants to discover potential 
employment that they might otherwise not know of, even though 
the employer is not obligated to find a claimant a job.39 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Stevens v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs,40 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act41 to support that an em-
33. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259. 
34. Id. at 1259-60. 
35. Id. at 1260. 
36. Id. 
37. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1260. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. 909 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990). 
41. See supra note 3. 
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ployee's disability status changes from total to partial only upon 
the date of available alternative employment.42 
The court noted that the statute's definition of "disability" 
equated physical impairment with incapacity to earn pre-injury 
wages.43 Hence, an employee is only able to work once a suitable 
job becomes available which he is then capable of performing.44 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that this interpretation best serves 
the statute's policy interests of rehabilitating injured workers to 
re-enter the work force by giving employers an incentive to show 
promptly the availability of jobs to employees.4!! 
In holding that a claimant's total disability status changes 
to partial once suitable alternative work is available, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the Benefit Review Board's holding that the 
change from total to partial disability status is retroactive to the 
date of maximum medical improvement.46 The court asserted 
that the Board's retroactive application of disability status 
change to the time of maximum medical improvement focuses 
on the medical aspect, but ignores the economic component of 
disability.47 Because a new job within the injured worker's abili-
ties may not have been available until after maximum medical 
improvement, total disability does not become partial until the 
employer meets its burden of showing available alternative em-
ployment that the claimant can perform and probably obtain if 
diligently sought.48 
42. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259. 
43.Id. 
44.Id. 
45. Id. at 1260. 
46. Id. at 1257. 
47. Stevens, 909 F.2d at 1259-60. 
48. Id. at 1260. 
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